High-interest payday loans have proliferated in recent years; so too have eorts to regulate them. Yet how borrowers respond to such regulations remains largely unknown.
Introduction
The payday lending industry has received widespread attention and intense scrutiny in recent years. Payday loans so-called because the loan is generally due on the date of the borrower's next paycheck are typically quite expensive. The APR associated with such loans commonly reaches triple digits. Despite their cost, payday loans have skyrocketed in popularity since the 1990s, with the number of payday loan stores more than doubling between 2000 and 2004. As of 2010, there were more payday loan stores in the United States than there were Starbucks and McDonald's combined ).
Because of their high interest rates, many criticize payday loans as predatory lending.
Payday lenders, critics allege, target low-income borrowers who are so desperate for funds that they are willing to pay exorbitant interest rates. Critics also argue that the structure of the loans exploits consumers by masking the true cost of borrowing. Those on the other side of the debate defend the high interest rates by pointing to the cost of lending to high-risk borrowers and by emphasizing the value to low-income households of having of access to (even expensive) credit. Advocates of payday lending also claim that restricting access to payday loans would simply shift consumer borrowing to other even more expensive forms of credit, such as bounced checks or late fees on bills.
Concerns about payday lending have recently led policymakers at both the State and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has announced that it too is considering adopting new regulations in this area (Zibel, 2015) .
Despite the attention paid to payday lending in recent years, the policy discussion has been hampered by a lack of empirical research on many of the most basic questions about demand for payday loans. Few data sets measure payday loan use and those that do are typically too small in sample size or too limited in question scope to answer many of the important questions for policy. Moreover, it is dicult to nd plausibly exogenous variation in payday loan usage those who use payday loans are likely to be dierent in unobservable ways from those who do not. Consequently, important basic questions about payday lending remain unanswered.
In this paper, we attempt to shed light on one of the most basic yet largely unknown questions concerning payday loan usage and regulation: How does borrowing behavior change when a state prohibits payday loans? Understanding the eect of payday loan bans on borrowing behavior is important for several (related) reasons. On a practical level, knowing the answer to this question is crucial for policymakers considering whether and how to regulate payday lending. If payday lending bans simply shift borrowing to other expensive forms of credit, attempts to deal with payday loans in isolation may be ineective or even counterproductive. Second, understanding how borrowing behavior changes after payday lending bans sheds light on the nature of demand for payday loans. For example, if payday loans are substitutes for other expensive credit sources, it suggests that the underlying cause of payday borrowing is a general desire (whether rational or not) for short-term credit, rather than some feature unique to the design or marketing of payday loans. Finally, understanding the eects of payday loan bans on a proximate outcome (i.e. borrowing behavior) sheds light on the large body of research linking payday loan access to other outcomes (e.g. credit scores, bankruptcies). Along the same lines, simply measuring the extent to which payday lending restrictions aect the amount of payday lending that occurs sheds light on what is currently an important unknown. Consumers in states that prohibit payday lending may borrow from stores in other states, may borrow online, or may nd lenders willing to skirt the law. Understanding the changes in payday lending associated with such bans is crucial for assessing and interpreting much of the existing payday lending literature that link payday loan laws to other nancial outcomes.
In this paper, we take advantage of two recent developments to study this question.
The rst is the availability of a new data set: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The survey is large, nationally-representative, and contains detailed information about consumer borrowing behavior. We augment this survey with data on traditional credit product usage from the Federal Reserve Board of New York. The second development we take advantage of is the fact that a number of states have prohibited the use of payday loans in recent years. Through a simple dierence-in-dierence design, we exploit this policy variation to study the eect of changes in consumer access to payday loans between states over time.
We nd that payday lending bans do not reduce the number of individuals who take out alternative nancial services (AFS) loans. Although far fewer individuals take out payday loans following the bans, that reduction is oset by an increase in the number of consumers who borrow from pawn shops. We also document that payday loan bans are associated with an increase in involuntary closures of consumers' checking accounts, a pattern that suggests consumers may substitute from payday loans to other forms of high interest credit such as bank overdrafts and bounced checks. In contrast, payday lending bans have no eect on the use of traditional forms of credit, such as credit cards and consumer nance loans. Finally, our results suggest that those who turn to pawnshop loans following payday loan bans do so because they lack access to small loans from traditional banks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I provides background on various forms of alternative nancial services. Section II reviews state regulations of those credit products.
Section III reviews the literature on the relationship between payday loan access, nancial well-being and the use of alternative nancial services. Section IV describes our data. Section V describes our empirical analysis and presents the results. Section VI concludes. Alternative nancial service (AFS) is a term used to describe credit products and other nancial services operating outside the traditional banking systems. Many AFS credit products are high-interest loans that are taken out for short time periods. AFS credit products include payday loans, pawnshops loans, rent-to-own loans, and overdraft services.
1 The following section briey describes these products. Payday loans are unsecured small-dollar short-term consumer loans. To obtain a loan, customers provide lenders a post-dated check (or authorize a delayed debit) for the loan's principal plus a fee that depends on the amount borrowed. The date of the loan maturity is pre-determined with a standard loan length of two or four weeks, often corresponding with the customer's next payday. The majority of loans range from $100 to $500 with an average loan amount of $375 (Stephens, 2011) . Typical loans carry a nancing charge of $15 for each $100 borrowed over a two-week period, which translates to an APR of just under 400 percent. If a customer is unable to pay back the loan at the agreed-upon date, she may rollover the loan for an additional fee, take out a new loan to cover the previous loan, or default on the loan. Although payday loans are marketed as short-term credit, the average customer holds a payday loan for ve months (Pew, 2012) .
To obtain a loan, customers must provide the lender with verication of income and a current checking account. Notably, payday lenders typically do not take customers' credit scores into account when making lending decisions. Instead, lenders consider potential borrowers' Teletrack scores, which measure whether the potential borrower has a history of writing bad checks Skiba and Tobacman (2009) . As a result, payday loans may be an attractive credit product for individuals whose credit history disqualies them from other credit sources.
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1 The term also encompasses other loan types, such as auto title loans and income tax refund anticipation loans.
2 More detailed descriptions of the industry can be found in Caskey (1994) and Drysdale and Keest (2000) .
3 Interestingly, despite being unsecured, Dobbie and Skiba (2013) nd that payday loan borrowers are less likely to default on larger loans.
Pawnshop Loans
Pawnshops have been a source of credit for centuries, but have steadily gained popularity in recent decades. The number of pawnshops in the United States increased from around 5,000 in 1985 to 9,000 in 1992 (Caskey, 1994) and is currently estimated at just over 12,000 storefronts (Carter, 2012) .
Pawn loans are also small-dollar short-term loans, but unlike payday loans, pawn loans are secured by physical collateral. Customers provide the lender with tangible personal property, such as electronics or jewelry, and in return, receive a cash loan based on the value of the collateral. The size of the pawn loan is typically only a fraction of the assessed value of the collateral, ensuring that the loan is more than fully secured.
4 Because pawnshop borrowers are not required to demonstrate a bank account or a regular source of income, they are accessible to a wider population than payday loans.
The average pawn loan is around $100, much smaller than the average loan received from a payday lender. Pawn loans usually have a term of one month and an average fee of $20 for each $100 borrowed, which translates to an APR of about 250 percent (Avery and Samolyk, 2011; Drysdale and Keest, 2000) .
5 If a pawnshop customer is unable to repay his loan, he forfeits the pawned item to the lender, who may resell it.
Rent-to-Own Loans
Unlike payday or pawn loans, rent-to-own stores do not provide cash loans; instead, they allow customers to purchase items on credit. The customer receives the item typically durable goods such as electronics, furniture, or appliances for immediate use from one of the 8,000 rent-to-own stores around the country (Czerwonko, 2013) . The cost of purchasing an item from a rent-to-own store on credit is substantially greater than the cost of similar items purchased directly. The implied APR varies by good and by store, but they have been estimated to be as low as 57 percent (Czerwonko, 2013) and as high as 230 percent (Zikmund-Fisher and Parker, 1999) . Like pawn loans, rent-to-own loans are secured: if a customer misses a payment, the lender has the right to repossess the purchased item.
Overdraft Protections
In addition to turning to one of the AFS lenders described above, many traditional banks oer overdraft services to their checking account customers. When an account-holder writes 4 Prager (2009) reports that the loan amount oered ranges between 25 and 65 percent of the estimated resale value of the collateral provided by the customer. a check or authorizes a debit for an amount that exceeds her account balance, the bank may allow an overdraft to occur. In that case, the bank allows the payment to proceed (as if the customer had sucient funds), but charges the customer an overdraft fee in addition to requiring repayment of the overdrafted amount. Overdraft protection is quite expensive, even when compared to other AFS credit products. The implied interest rates and fees associated with overdraft loans typically exceed the interest charged by payday lenders for small loans.
Other Forms of Non-Traditional Credit
In addition to the formal types of credit products described above, individuals may borrow against the future by delaying various payments past their due date. For example, consumers may delay paying utility bills or write checks that they expect to bounce. Of course, borrowing in such forms is far from free: paying utility bills behind schedule typically triggers expensive late fees, may adversely aect the borrowers' credit score if the debt is sold to a collection agency, and banks may ne consumers who write checks that bounce. Additionally, banks will generally close the accounts of borrowers who engage in too many overdrafts or non-sucient funds activity (Campbell, Martinez-Jerez and Tufano, 2012) .
B. Traditional Credit Products
By traditional credit we mean credit products such as credit cards and small personal loans issued by mainstream banks, nance companies, and retailers that participate in national credit reporting systems. Bank-issued general purpose credit cards are the most common form of traditional credit, and allow individuals with existing credit lines to quickly borrow small amounts. According to data from the Federal Reserve, the average annual interest rate on card accounts assessed interest has been in the range of 13 to 14 percent in recent years, but for riskier borrowers, posted rates are often as high as 20 to 30 percent. In addition, for certain transactions such as cash advances there may be additional fees (e.g., three percent of the amount advanced). Individuals with very low credit scores (e.g. a FICO score in the low 500s or below) due to a recent default may have trouble obtaining new card accounts, but would still be able to access existing revolving accounts that were opened when their nancial standing was better.
C. Substitution Among Credit Products
Because of the dierences in their designs, various credit products may or may not be substitutes for one another for non-regulatory reasons. First, some borrowers may be willing to pay the interest required to take out certain types of loans, but not others. For example, pawn shops require borrowers to risk losing ownership of a valuable possession some borrowers may be unwilling to do so. Second, some borrowers may not be eligible for all types of loans. Traditional bank loans and credit cards have credit score eligibility cut-os, which some borrowers cannot meet. Likewise, using overdraft protection services requires a bank account and taking out a payday loan requires both a bank account and a relatively steady income source. Finally, even for borrowers who have access to more than one type of loan, the net eects of restricting that access on consumer demand may be ambiguous. states have strict usury laws that limit the allowable APR of cash loans to well below the amount thy is typically charged for payday loans, many of those states have special carveouts for payday loans. In addition, until 2005, payday lenders were able to exploit a loophole in national banking law that allowed them to operate even in those states that did prohibit payday loans.
6 Today, state regulation of payday lenders take on a variety of forms. While some states explicitly ban payday lending through usury laws or racketeering statutes, others have adopted regulations that eectively ban payday loans by limiting interest below the rate at which payday lenders are willing to operate (Skiba, 2012). 7 As of January 2006, the start 6 Specically, payday lenders could take advantage of the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., which held that banks were governed by the usury law of the state in which they were chartered, rather than the state in which they operated (Schiltz, 2003) . By partnering with banks chartered in states that had permissive usury laws, payday lenders could do business as the loan originator for the bank in states in which payday lending would otherwise be prohibited. 7 For example, after Oregon passed a law limiting the fees associated with loans under $50,000 to $10 per $100, less than a quarter of the payday lending outlets in the state remained a year later (Zinman, 2010) .
In addition, states that allow payday lending dier in the extent to which payday loans are regulated. In particular, 25 states limit the number of times that borrowers may roll-over their loans (Carter, 2012 9 Figure 1 provides a map of payday lending laws by state.
Other AFS credit products are subject to state regulation. In particular, states may regulate both the loan length and the interest that can be charged on a pawn loan. Many states have no fee limits, while other states have limits as low as $2 per $100 for a two-week loan; however, unlike payday lenders, pawn shops continue to operate in states with even the most restrictive policies. In contrast, rent-to-own stores are often able to avoid state regulations on APR disclosure requirements or interest rate caps on the grounds that the contracts signed by customers are terminable-at-will. Several states have passed legislation regulating disclosure on rent-to-own merchandise including the cash price and the total cost to own Czerwonko (2013) . There were no major changes in pawn or rent-to-own loan regulations at the state level during our sample period.
III. Prior Literature
This section briey reviews the rapidly growing literature on payday lending. Although data availability has limited the types of questions that can be investigated, prior research has 8 These states include Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia.
9 Apart from the policy changes that we classify as implementing a new payday lending ban (listed in this paragraph), several other states changed their rules regarding payday lending during our sample period.
Both Oregon and Colorado tightened their restrictions on payday lenders Oregon in 2008 and Colorado
in 2010 but continued to allow payday lenders to operate and to charge relatively high interest rates. In addition, Ohio passed legislation in 2008 that prohibited payday loans but various reports suggest that the ban was not actually enforced (Pew, 2012) .
Arkansas presents a complicated case for our analysis. The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled the law that authorized payday lending unconstitutional in November 2008, but the eective legality of payday lending was already in question as early as 2001, with the state attorney general and the payday lending industry disagreeing as to whether the state's usury limit applied to payday lenders (Bodeker, 2010) . Another complication is that the Arkansas usury limit varied substantially over the rst wave of our sample, as it was pegged to the market interest rate. To avoid mis-coding the eective legality of payday lending in Arkansas during our sample pre-period, we drop the state from our analysis. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention. yielded a number of important insights into payday loan usage.
A. The Eect of Payday Loan Regulations on Payday Loan Use
While data on the use of payday loans is limited, a small number of papers estimate the eect of payday loan restrictions on usage rates. Chanani (2011) and Pew (2012) 
B. The Eect of Payday Loan Regulations on Financial Well-Being
From a theoretical perspective, the eect of payday loan access on economic well-being is ambiguous. Neoclassical models suggest that consumers use payday loans when they are preferable to the available alternatives. Such models imply that restricting access would necessarily make consumers worse o. On the other hand, behavioral models of payday loan usage imply that present-bias, over-optimism, or other cognitive biases can induce consumers to take out payday loans even when doing so is sub-optimal, as judged by their own preferences. If such models accurately describe behavior, restricting access to payday loans could actually make consumers better o.
The empirical literature on the link between payday loan access and nancial well-being comes to mixed conclusions. A number of papers nd evidence that payday loan access improves nancial outcomes. For example, Morgan, Strain and Seblani (2012) nd that payday loan access is associated with lower rates of bankruptcy. Similarly, Morse (2011) suggests that individuals are less likely to foreclose on their homes if they have access to payday loans.
In contrast, others nd that access to payday loans exacerbates borrowers' nancial difculties. Skiba and Tobacman (2009) exploit a discontinuity in payday loan eligibility and nd that payday loan access increases the likelihood of declaring bankruptcy. Carrell and Zinman (2014) nd that a law that restricted access to payday loans among military personnel led to an increase in job performance among Air Force members. Melzer (2011) and 10 The law considered in Zinman (2010) is the interest rate cap in Oregon mentioned in Section II. Classifying the Oregon policy change as a ban generates nearly identical estimates to those presented in this paper.
states that prohibit payday loans but dier in their proximity to a neighboring jurisdiction where payday lending is legal. These papers nd that access to payday loans is associated with worse outcomes along a variety of measures of economic hardship, such as diculty paying bills, food security, and postponing medical care due to costs. Hynes (2012) investigates the relationship between payday loan legality and bankruptcy and reports mixed evidence, with the results varying by identication strategy. Lars Lefgren and Frank McIntyre (2009) nd that state variation in payday loan legality does not explain much of the state-by-state variation in bankruptcy ling rates. Finally, two recent papers, Bhutta (2013) and Bhutta, Skiba and Tobacman (2014) nd that access to payday loans (at either the individual or state level) appears to have little to no long-term eect on consumers' credit scores.
C. The Eect of Payday Loan Regulations on Usage of Other Credit Products 1. Alternative Financial Services
A number of papers have studied the interaction between payday loan access and the usage of other high interest products. Skiba and Tobacman (2007) presents mixed evidence concerning the substitutability between payday and pawnshop loans. They nd that individuals who are barely denied payday loans due to low credit scores are more likely to take out a pawn loan within the next two days. However, such individuals do not appear any more likely to use pawn loans in the future. Turning to borrowers who do use payday loans, Carter (2012) nds that such borrowers are more likely to also use pawnshops when their state does not limit payday loan roll-overs. She interprets this pattern as evidence that payday borrowers use pawn loans to pay o the interest on their payday loans in order to roll the loan over, rather than default. Carter and Skiba (2011) provide further support for this theory by presenting evidence that payday loan customers who take out a pawn loan within one day of their payday loan due date are more likely to rollover their payday loan.
Although these studies help explain patterns of use in states where both payday and pawn loans are legal, they do not address the question of how pawnshop borrowing responds when access to payday loans is restricted statewide.
Evidence on the relationship between payday loan and overdraft use is similarly mixed. Zinman (2010) nds that residents of states that restricted payday loans were more likely to bounce checks after the ban. Morgan, Strain and Seblani (2012) and Melzer and Morgan (2009) nd similar results for overdraft fee income at banks. However, Campbell, MartinezJerez and Tufano (2012) nds that a payday loan ban in Georgia led to a reduction in involuntary checking account closures, an outcome that is closely associated with bouncing too many checks. Galperin and Weaver (2014) nd a similar result with regards to the use of refund anticipation loans (RALs) bans on payday loans lead to a decrease in the use of RALs, suggesting that the two products are complements.
Thus the current literature yields a somewhat conicting view of the relationship between payday loans and other AFS credit products. Particularly for pawn loans, evidence exists that consumers turn to pawn loans as complements to payday loans (at least in states that allow rollovers). On the other hand, some studies suggest that consumers turn to other forms of high interest credit (e.g. overdrafts and bounced checks) when they lose access to payday loans, while other research suggests the opposite.
Our paper builds on this literature by drawing on a nationally-representative data set that includes information about multiple forms of borrowing behavior that may plausibly be important substitutes for payday loans. In particular, our data captures AFS credit usage at the individual level, even when the loans are taken out from multiple lenders.
Additionally, as described in the next section, a useful feature of the CPS data is that it contains information on consumers' motivations for using AFS credit products, which will help provide a more nuanced view of the ways in which payday loan regulations shape consumer borrowing behavior.
Traditional Credit
Traditional credit products have considerably lower interest rates than payday loans and other AFS products, however, they often have stricter requirements and loan size limits. Therefore, standard economic models would predict that consumers would only use payday loans if they had exhausted the limits of, or were never eligible for, traditional credit products.
However, survey data indicate that some payday loans users might switch to bank loans or credit cards if payday loans did not exist (Pew, 2012) . A preference for payday loans over traditional credit sources could reect some perceived non-price advantage of payday loans.
For example, payday lenders may be more convenient for some borrowers. Additionally, payday loan use is not reported on credit reports, which could appeal to some customers.
Alternatively, choosing a payday loan over a credit card could reect borrowers' confusion or a lack of awareness about relative prices. For example, payday loan prices are typically quoted as a two-week rate (e.g., 15 percent) whereas credit card interest rates are quoted as an annual rate that is numerically similar, and thus consumers may believe that the prices for these products are comparable (Agarwal et al., 2006; Pew, 2012) .
In spite of the survey evidence suggesting that payday loans may, in fact, be substitutes for traditional credit products rather than a strictly inferior alternative, few studies have analyzed whether payday loan customers shift toward the use of credit cards or other traditional credit products when access to payday loans is limited. Agarwal, Skiba and Tobacman (2009) nd that payday loan users have signicant liquidity remaining in their credit card accounts on the day of the loan, suggesting that payday loan users have option of switching to traditional credit sources if payday loan access was suddenly limited. However, Bhutta, Skiba and Tobacman (2014) nd, using dierent data, that most customers exhaust their credit supply at the time of their rst payday loan application. Our paper adds to this literature by measuring whether the use of three traditional credit products credit card debt, retail card debt, and consumer nance loans increases after a state bans payday loans.
IV. Data
Our primary data source comes from the FDIC's National Survey of Unbanked and Under- The survey questionnaire contains questions regarding a household's connection to traditional banking systems, use of alternative nancial services, and respondents' reasons for being unbanked or underbanked. Survey participants were asked whether anyone in the household had used a payday loan, sold items at a pawn shop, or leased merchandise from a rent-to-own store in the past year.
11 For the 2009 survey, we categorize a household as having used a payday loan in the past year if they responded with a non-zero answer to the question How many times in the last 12 months did you or anyone in your household use payday loan or payday advance services? Similarly, we categorize a household as having used a pawnshop or rent-to-own in the past year if their response to the question How often do you or anyone in your household sell items at pawn shops/[do business at a rent-to-own store]? was At least a few times a year or Once or twice a year. In the 2011 survey, a household is recorded as having used one of these alternative nancial services products if they responded armatively to the question In the past 12 months, did (you/or anyone in your household) have a payday loan/[pawn an item because cash was needed]/[have a 11 Additionally, participants were asked about their use of refund anticipation loans; however the reference period asked about in this survey question varied across survey waves.
rent-to-own agreement]?
Unlike many other data sets that have been used to report patterns of borrowing behavior, the CPS survey asks participants not only about use of alternative nancial services, but also about their reasons for using these forms of credit. Participants who reported using payday loans in the past year were asked why they chose to use these loans rather than a traditional bank loan. A similar question was asked of pawnshop users. In addition, customers who reported using any alternative nancial service credit product in the past year were asked about the purpose of the loan. 12 For more information on the CCP, see Lee and Van der Klaauw (2010) . All individuals in the data are anonymous: names, street addresses and social security numbers have been suppressed. Individuals are distinguished and can be linked over time through a unique, anonymous consumer identication number assigned by Equifax.
The following section examines the eect of the recent payday loan regulations described in Section III. Using data collected before and after the policy changes, we compare borrowing behavior in states that changed their payday loan regulations with borrowing behavior in states that did not. Because our analysis includes state xed eects, our estimated coefcients are identied from dierences in changes in borrowing behavior between the two groups of states.
A. Summary Statistics 1. Use of Alternative Financial Services Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the use of alternative nancial services from the CPS data. Column 1 reports lifetime usage rates: 4.1 percent used a payday loan, 6.8 percent used a pawnshop, and 4.2 percent purchased merchandise at a rent-to-own store. Overall, 11.7 percent used at least one of these three AFS products. Column 2 reports statistics on the use of the same credit products during the past 12 months. The table shows that an estimated 2.5 percent of the population used a payday loan in the past year. Comparing this quantity to Column 1 suggests that over half of the individuals who had ever used a payday loan in their lives did so at some point during the past year. A similar proportion of participants used either pawnshops or rent-to-own in the past year 2.5 and 1.7 percent, respectively. Overall, 5.7 percent of participants used one of the AFS products in the past year. Table 2 compares the characteristics of individuals who used AFS credit products during the previous year to other survey participants. Relative to the general population, users of AFS credit are more likely to be female, single, black, and young. These demographic patterns appear broadly similar across users of dierent types of AFS products. AFS users are also more likely to be socioeconomically disadvantaged in terms of income, education, and employment status; however, these characteristics do vary across the type of product used.
Payday loan users, while still economically disadvantaged when compared to individuals who do not use AFS products, have more education than pawnshop or rent-to-own users and are less likely to be unemployed. This is likely due to the fact that payday loan customers are required to show proof of employment to obtain a loan.
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13 Note however that since the survey asks about payday loan use in the previous year, we may observe some currently unemployed participants reporting use of payday loans. Table 3 provides summary statistics for three types of consumer debt: general purpose bankissued credit card debt, retail store credit card debt, and consumer nance loans. Across all consumers and quarters, the average credit card balance is $3,677, with about 57 percent of observations having a positive credit card balance.
Use of Traditional Credit Sources
14 Because payday loan borrowers are most likely to be in the bottom end of the credit risk score distribution (see Bhutta, Skiba and Tobacman (2014) ), we also restrict our analysis to the subset of consumers with an initial credit risk score below 600 since payday loan bans most directly aect this subgroup. Retail card balances are much smaller, on average, than credit card balances, and far fewer individuals appear to use such cards. Interestingly, unlike with general purpose bankissued credit cards, the usage statistics for the low-score sample are fairly similar to those for the broader sample of consumers about a quarter of both groups use these cards with an average balance of about $300 among those who do use them. Finally, consumer loans are relatively infrequent 15 percent of customers in the full sample and 21 percent of customers in the low score sample use this type of loan though the average balance among consumer loan users is signicantly larger than with retail cards. Overall, two-thirds of the sample used at least one of the three types of traditional credit for an average balance of $4,549.
The fraction of individuals in the low-credit sample using at least one form of credit was almost as high as in the full sample (58 percent), though the average balance was only about half the size.
Motivations for AFS Credit Product Use i. Expenditures Financed with AFS Loans
Alternative nancial service credit products are often marketed as short-term solutions for emergency cash needs among liquidityconstrained individuals. Table 4 presents the reasons why AFS users report using these credit products. The most common reason cited for using an AFS loan was not to meet an emergency need: almost half of AFS users (44 percent) reported using the loan to cover basic living expenses. An additional 5 percent reported using the loan to purchase luxury goods. Nineteen percent of customers used the loans to make up for lost income, 13 percent 14 Reported balances include both transaction or convenience-use balances and revolving balances. of customers used the loan for auto or home repairs, and 2 percent used the loan to pay for medical expenses.
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ii. Motivation for Choosing AFS Loan Instead of Traditional Bank Loan Traditional banks oer much lower interest rates on consumer loans than either payday lenders or pawnshops. However, payday lenders and pawnshops typically serve a low-income, high-risk population that may not be eligible for traditional bank loans and are, therefore, forced to use these high-interest loans due to lack of alternative forms of credit. Alternatively, these customers may have access to cheaper forms of credit, but nd using payday lenders or pawnshops more appealing due to other factors such as convenience or ease of use. Column 1 of Table 5 presents the main reasons that payday loan customers report using a payday loan instead of a traditional bank loan.
17 Over half of customers report using a payday loan because the loan was easier or faster to obtain or because the storefronts had more convenient hours or location than traditional banks. Only 16 percent of customers reported that they did not qualify for a bank loan and 21 percent of customers used a payday loan because banks do not give small dollar loans. Column 2 shows that pawnshop customers report similar reasons for using a pawn loan rather than a traditional bank loan. Since only a minority of respondents cite lack of access to bank loans, it is possible that payday loan bans might result in increased usage of more traditional forms of credit.
B. Econometric Analysis
This section investigates the eect of recent changes in the regulation of payday loans on the use of payday loans and on the use of other forms of AFS credit. Our approach employs a dierence-in-dierence framework: we compare changes in borrowing behavior in states that change the legality of payday loans with changes in states that do not. Relative to much of the prior literature, this approach has the advantage of identifying the eect of payday loan regulation without relying exclusively on cross-sectional variation in state regulation, which may conate dierences in state by state borrowing behavior with dierences in payday loan legality. The treatment eect we identify comes from comparing the jurisdictions that changed their payday loan regulations during our sample period. Like other dierence-in-dierence analyses, our identifying assumption is that absent the regulatory 16 These estimates are very similar to those found in the Pew Charitable Trust Small Dollar Loans data.
That study found that 16 percent of payday loan customers used their rst loan to cover unexpected expenses (such as car repair or medical expenses), while 69 percent used the loan to cover recurring expenses, including rent, groceries, utilities, car payments, and credit card debt (Pew, 2012). 17 This table includes data from 2011 only, since the available categories for reasons a customer used a payday loan rather than a traditional bank changed across survey waves. change, borrowing behavior would have evolved similarly in states that changed their law and in states that did not. By considering changes from multiple states, we are able to control for characteristics other than payday loan laws that could plausibly aect borrowing behavior and that vary across states over time, such as local economic conditions. Our empirical specication takes the following form:
The unit of observation is an individual i in state s in time period t. The dependent variable, y, is an indicator variable for having used a certain type of credit product in the last year, Ban is an indicator variable which takes a value of one if the individual lives in a state where payday loans were eectively illegal in the period covered by the survey, P ost is an indicator variable for being interviewed in the second wave of the survey, δ is a set of state xed eects, X is a set of individual-level covariates, and Z is a set of state-level controls.
Because the CPS data over-samples certain groups, analyses using that data are weighted to provide nationally representative estimates.
Trends in Treatment and Control States
Before presenting our main results, we assess the comparability of the treatment and control states. State policy towards payday loans is not determined randomly; the decisions of legislatures or courts to allow or ban payday loans may depend on factors that are correlated with the behavior of borrowers in the state. For example, growing anti-AFS loan sentiment in a state may simultaneously cause borrowers to stop using such loans and politicians to pass legislation against them.
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One way to investigate this issue is by looking at pre-period trends in the two groups of states. If we observe that demand for AFS borrowing in prior years is increasing or decreasing in the treatment states relative to the control states, it might suggest that the changes in policy are confounded by secular trends in AFS usage. Although we can't directly assess the parallel trends assumption upon which our dierence-in-dierences design relies, observing important dierences in the pre-treatment trends might suggest the trends diered in the treatment period as well.
Ideally, we would undertake this analysis with each of the outcome variables in our analysis. This is possible with the traditional credit product use variables, as the CCP data begins in 2006, two years before the rst state policy changes. Unfortunately, only one wave 18 Note though that although this story could explain our nding that payday loan bans reduce payday loan usage, it does not predict the associated rise in pawnshop loan usage that we nd. of the FDIC data was collected prior to the state policy changes we consider here; hence we cannot use it to identify pre-period trends in the AFS credit product variables from that source. We supplement the analysis by comparing macroeconomic trends among the two groups of states.
The results are presented in Figures 2 and 3 . The treatment group contains consumers residing in one of the jurisdictions that changed banned payday loans during our window, while control states are those classied as always permissive or always restrictive in Figure   1 . Dashed lines indicate the time range in which these policies were implemented. Figure   2a plots the fraction of consumers holding any credit card debt, the most common type of traditional credit debt in our data, and Figure 2b plots the fraction holding any one of the three types of traditional credit debt in our data (credit card, retail card, or consumer nance loan). While consumers in control states are slightly more likely to hold traditional credit debt than those in treatment states, the trends in credit use appear quite similar. We also observe similar movements across treatment and control states in unemployment rates ( Figure 3a ) and state income per capita (Figure 3b ).
The Eect of Payday Loan Bans on Payday Loan Use
As a rst step in our analysis, we measure how stricter payday loan regulations aect payday loan use in the states in which the regulations are enacted. Although one would expect the eect to be negative, media reports and other authors have noted that compliance with the rules may be imperfect and that consumers may still be able to borrow online. Additionally, understanding the magnitude of the change in payday loan use is important for assessing and interpreting other results (both those reported here and elsewhere) concerning the eect of payday loan access on other outcome measures. Table 6 presents the results of the analysis investigating the eect of the regulations on payday loan use.
19 Column 1 presents a bare-bones specication with controls for time-period and whether the individual's state prohibits the use of payday loans. Using these limited controls, the model shows that payday loan usage is 2.4 percentage points lower in states that ban payday loans. Column 2 adds in region xed eects and the estimate decreases slightly to a drop in payday loan use of 2.1 percentage points. The model in column 3 the dierence-in-dierences model includes state xed eects rather than region xed eects.
This model estimates a decrease in payday loan use of 3.2 percentage points. Column 4 adds individual-level demographic characteristics to the model, specically: gender, race, marital status, education, age, income, and employment status. After controlling for these 19 We estimate demand for payday loans using a linear probability model; a probit model yields qualitatively similar results. For all specications, we report standard errors clustered by state. demographics, the size of the ban coecient decreases slightly to 3.1 percentage points.
Finally, because payday loan use may be correlated with the business cycle, it is important to control for local economic conditions. Column 5 (our preferred specication) adds controls for state unemployment and personal income per capita, as well as state population; with these additional controls the estimated eect of the ban is a 2.8 percentage point reduction in payday loan use, an 88 percent reduction from the usage levels in states where the loans are legal. Across specications, our model suggests a large reduction in payday loan usage following the adoption of restrictive state laws.
The Eect of Payday Loan Bans on Other AFS Credit Products
The following section investigates how payday loan restrictions aect the use of other types of AFS credit products. If these other forms of high-interest credit are substitutes for payday loans, we would expect that individuals who previously used payday loans would switch to using one of the other AFS products after payday loans are banned. However, if these other forms of credit are complements to payday loans for example, if payday loan customers take out a pawn loan to avoid defaulting on the original loan as suggested in Carter (2012) then we would expect to see a reduction in the use of pawn shops and rent-to-own. Additionally, dierences between the credit products (e.g., that payday loans require a checking account or that pawn shop loans require collateral) may limit substitution between otherwise-similar types of loans. Table 7 presents the results of these analyses. Column 1 presents estimates of the eect of payday loan regulations on usage of any AFS credit product (dened here as a payday loan, pawn shop loan, or a rent-to-own loan). The estimated point estimate is close to zero and statistically insignicant. Because we nd that payday loan regulations are associated with a reduction in one type of AFS product (i.e. payday loans), this result suggests that usage of a dierent AFS product must have increased in an osetting way. Indeed, as Columns 3 reveals, payday loan restrictions are associated with a positive and statistically signicant eect on pawn shop loan usage the estimated eect is 1.6 percentage points, a 60 percent increase from the mean usage rate in states where payday loans are legal. This nding suggests that consumers turn to pawn shop loans as a substitute form of borrowing when payday loans are no longer available. In contrast, Column 4 suggests that there is no such evidence of a shift to rent-to-own loans following the payday loan bans. The dierence in substitutability between payday loans and these two alternative forms of credit may not be surprising since payday lenders and pawnshops both oer customers cash loans while rentto-own outlets only oer credit for the purchase of very specic items. If payday customers use their loan for reasons other than the purchase of electronics, appliances, or furniture, then a rent-to-own agreement will be an unlikely substitute.
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Although the CPS survey contains relatively direct data on the types of AFS products listed above, it also contains some information that can be used to study whether consumers substitute from payday loans to another form of high-interest credit: bank overdrafts. In particular, the survey asks respondents whether a bank has decided to close their checking account (involuntarily) during the prior 12 months. Because such closures are almost always triggered by the excessive use of bounced checks and overdrafts (Campbell, Martinez-Jerez and Tufano, 2012) , we can investigate whether the payday loan bans are associated with increases in such activities. Table 8 While small in terms of population size, this coecient is quite large economically considering that just over 0.1 percent of our sample report ever experiencing an involuntary bank closure.
Although banks may close consumers' checking accounts for reasons other than failure to pay overdrafts or too many bounced checks, the positive coecient is consistent with consumers substituting to these high-interest credit devices when payday loans are no longer available.
The Eect of Payday Loan Bans on the Reasons for Using AFS Credit
The results in the previous section suggested that although payday loan regulations reduced the usage of payday loans, many consumers turned to other forms of high interest credit.
Despite the fact that the bans did not signicantly reduce the overall proportion of individuals using AFS credit, those who shifted from payday loans to other AFS products may use the new loans to cover dierent types of expenses. For example, if customers are hesitant to risk losing personal items to a pawnshop, they may only use pawn loans to nance emergency expenses, rather than day-to-day consumption. Additionally, the average pawnshop loan is much smaller (only a quarter of the size) of the average payday loan, so it may only be useful for covering small expenses. Table 9 looks at consumers who use AFS credit products; it investigates whether payday loan bans change the types of expenditures such consumers nance with the AFS loan. The dependent variable in each regression is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the respondent used an AFS loan and reported that the main reason for taking out the loan was to nance the specied type of expense. Each column shows the eect of payday loan bans on the likelihood of using an AFS loan for a distinct category of expense. The estimated treatment eect in Column 1 (the probability of taking out an AFS loan to make up for 20 Although this analysis is identied by policy changes in three states, the results appear to be largely driven by Arizona, the largest of the treated states. Excluding Arizona from the analysis yields estimated coecients that are statistically indistinguishable from zero. job loss or a decrease in income) is positive and statistically signicant. Since the total use of AFS loans did not change as a result of the ban, this increase is oset by a decrease in the probability of using AFS loans for other reasons including luxuries, other expenses, and childcare. This result suggests that although payday loan bans may not aect the total number of individuals taking out AFS loans, those who continue to use AFS loans after a ban are more likely to use them for emergency expenses, such as a shock to the household's income, rather than special gifts or recurring expenses.
The Eect of Payday Loan Bans on Traditional Credit Use
In this section, we test whether payday lending bans result in greater usage of credit cards and consumer loans using data from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax (CCP).
The econometric model is similar to the dierence-in-dierences model discussed above, with a few key changes. First, the CCP data includes a very limited set of demographic characteristics. However, the panel structure of the CCP data allows us to follow the same individual over time; therefore, our model now includes individual xed eects which capture all time-invariant individual characteristics (η i ). Our new econometric model is given by:
The unit of observation is an individual i in state s in time period t, where t is now quarter instead of survey wave. The dependent variable, y, is either an indicator variable for having a positive credit balance in a given quarter or the log of the balance amount. As before, Ban indicates living in a state where payday loans were eectively illegal in the quarter considered, δ is a set of state xed eects, X includes the limited set of time-varying individual-level covariates (age and age-squared), and Z is a set of state-level macroeconomic controls. In place of the variable P ost, we now include time xed eects at the quarter level, λ.
Additionally, while the CPS data used in the previous section provides annual credit use data at two points in time (2008 and 2011) , the CCP data includes quarterly snapshots of credit use from 2006-2012 during which time three states and the District of Columbia banned payday lending. All regressions include quarter xed eects. Lastly, we consider two outcome variables for each of the three credit types considered: an indicator variable for having a non-zero debt balance (extensive margin) and the log debt balance among users (intensive margin). Table 10 provides estimates of the eect of payday loan bans on the use of credit card, retail card, and consumer loan debt. For each debt category, the outcome in the rst column is credit use on the extensive margin while the second column refers to credit use on the intensive margin. For each of the three types of debt, on both margins, the point estimates are close to zero and insignicant. Table 11 is analogous to Table 10 , but uses the lowscore sample, a population that more likely represents the typical payday loan user. As noted above, to the extent that payday loan demand is much higher within this population, substitution into credit cards and consumer loans as a result of payday loan bans may show up more clearly in these regressions. However, as in Table 10 , the estimates both on the extensive and intensive margins are close to zero and insignicant.
21 Overall, there is no evidence in these data that payday loan bans result in substitution into more traditional (and generally cheaper) forms of credit.
Income Dierences in Responses to Payday Loan Bans
In this section we investigate dierences in the eect of payday loan bans by borrower income.
If low income borrowers are less elastic in their demand for credit, those borrowers may be more likely to switch to pawn shops in response to a ban on payday borrowing. On the other hand, middle income borrowers who take out on payday loans may also be inelastic in their demand for credit (as evidenced by their willingness to take out payday loans in the rst place). Table 12 investigates these possibilities by interacting the eect of the ban with borrower income. Apart from this, the econometric specication is the same as in the main AFS analysis:
y ist = β 1 Ban st +β 2 Ban st * LowIncome i +φ 1 P ost t +φ 2 P ost t * LowIncome i +δ s +γX i +πZ st +ε ist where LowIncome i is an indicator for whether the borrower's income is below $50,000 (the mean income in our sample). The results suggest that both high-and low-income individuals reduce their usage of payday loans following a ban, but that the reduction in usage among those with lower incomes is greater in magnitude. Similarly, we observe increases in pawnshop borrowing rates among high and low-income individuals, but here the magnitude of the estimated eects appear similar in magnitude. Interestingly, Column 1 suggests that payday loan bans are associated with a modest reduction in the overall rate of AFS borrowing, but only once the analysis is restricted to low income borrowers. Overall, Table 12 is consistent with the possibility that even higher income users of payday loans are inelastic in their demand for credit, and as a result, willing to substitute to pawn shops when payday loans become unavailable.
21 Results are very similar if we limit the time period to 2008-2011, as in the analysis of the CPS data.
Longer Term Eects of Payday Loan Bans
In this section we investigate whether the eects of payday loan bans on AFS credit use dier several years after a ban has been implemented. For example, demand for credit may be relatively inelastic over the short-run, but more elastic over the long-run. If so, removing the option of taking out a payday loan might have caused borrowers to switch to other types of AFS credit immediately following a ban, but these substitution patterns may have dissipated by the time the ban had been in place for a few years.
To study this possibility, we use data from the third wave of the CPS survey, which covers borrowing behavior between June 2012 and June 2013. Because our focus is on the longer-term eect of the ban, the specication includes data from the rst and third survey waves only. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 13 . The point estimates for the various types of AFS use are largely similar to those obtained from the main analysis, though the estimate for the involuntary bank closures is smaller and no longer signicant.
This suggests that the immediate eects of a ban on borrower behavior are not substantially dierent than the eects a few years after the ban has been in place.
VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eect of state-level payday loan restrictions on the use of payday loans and on borrowing behavior more generally. Our results suggest that these restrictions are eective at curbing the use of payday loans; on average, approximately three percent of borrowers used payday loans before a restriction, compared with less than one percent who do so after a ban. However, we also found that this reduction in payday loan use was accompanied by an increase in the use of pawnshop loans, with no eect on the use of credit card debt or consumer nance loans. Additionally, we document an increase in involuntary checking account closures following payday loan bans, which suggests that some consumers become more likely to bounce checks and overdraft their bank accounts when payday loans become unavailable. Overall, we nd that the adoption of payday loan restrictions do not appear to meaningfully reduce the fraction of the population that utilizes alternative nancial services; borrowers who previously used payday loans substitute to other forms of AFS credit.
It is important to note several limitations of our study before concluding. First, our analysis examines the eect of policy changes in only four jurisdictions. While these jurisdictions are quite diverse, both demographically and geographically, regulations in other states may have a dierent impact on borrowing behavior. In particular, our results appear to be largely driven by Arizona, the biggest of the states that implemented a ban during our sample period. Second, like other dierence-in-dierence designs, our results are only valid to the extent that the treatment and control states are not characterized by preexisting trends; states that chose to ban payday lending during our sample period could have experienced unrelated increases in pawn lending and involuntary bank accounts, even were they to have allowed payday lending to remain legal. Third, our analysis is limited by the types of borrowing that are covered in our data set. Customers may increase their use of other forms of credit that we cannot observe, such as borrowing from family members or loan sharks. Relatedly, our AFS results pertain only to the extensive margin of borrowing behavior. That is, although we nd that the fraction of individuals taking out AFS loans remains largely unchanged following a ban, we cannot rule out changes in the number of loans a borrower takes out, the interest charged, or the total dollar amount of borrowing.
Our results should be interpreted with these caveats in mind.
Despite these caveats, our results provide new evidence on important questions of payday loan policy. Most importantly, they suggest that the issue of payday loans cannot be addressed in isolation, without considering the availability and desirability of other forms of high-interest credit. Whether payday loans are good or bad, our analysis shows that it is important to determine whether they are better or worse than the available alternatives.
If policymakers conclude that payday loans are better than the available alternatives, restricting access to them (while not regulating other potential substitutes) may end up being counter-productive.
Apart from helping to predict the likely eects of payday loan bans, our results shed light on the nature of consumer demand for payday loans. In particular, the fact that consumers switch to other forms of high interest credit once payday loans become unavailable suggests that demand for such loans is fueled by a general desire for short-term credit (rather than a decision-making bias that is unique to the design of payday loans).
Finally, our results shed light on the mechanisms by which access to payday loans may aect consumers' nancial well-being. That is, they suggest that the ultimate eects of payday loan bans on nancial outcomes are not being mediated through changes in the overall amount of high-interest borrowing undertaken by consumers. Along these lines, two recent papers 22 nd that payday loan access has little if any long-term eect (positive or negative) on borrowers' credit scores. This lack of an eect on borrower's nancial health can be readily explained by our nding that payday loan bans do not stop borrowers from taking out high-interest loans, but merely shift the type of credit to which they turn.
22 Bhutta (2013) and Bhutta, Skiba and Tobacman (2014) Any AFS refers to any use of payday, pawn, or rent-to-own loans. Individuals are classied as using a credit product if they report use in prior year.
Any AFS refers to any use of payday, pawn, or rent-to-own loans. Individuals are classied as using a credit product if they report use in prior year. Outcome: indicator for ever using a payday loan in the prior year.
Demographic controls also include indicator variables for sixteen income categories.
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Outcome: indicator for ever using the specied loan type in the prior year.
Any AFS refers to any use of payday, pawn, or rent-to-own loans.
All specications include individual demographic characteristics, state-level economic conditions, and state xed eects.
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Outcome: indicator for using AFS credit for the specied reason. Reasons include: make up for lost income, basic living expenses, house or car repairs, medical expenses, school or child care, luxuries, or other expenses.
All specications include individual demographic characteristics, state-level economic conditions, and state xed eects. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Outcome: ever is an indicator for using the specied credit type in that quarter, balance is the credit balance among users in logs. Dependent variable mean for balance in levels.
All specications include quarter xed eects, individual xed eects, age, age squared, and state-level economic conditions. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Sample includes individuals with credit scores below 600. Outcome: ever is an indicator for using the specied credit type in that quarter; balance is the credit balance among users in logs.
All specications include quarter xed eects, individual xed eects, age, age squared, and state-level economic conditions. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Outcome: indicator for ever using the specied loan type in the prior year.
Low-income refers to households with income less than $50,000.
Bank Closure refers to experiencing an involuntary bank closure.
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < .10, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Treatment and control means weighted by population.
Dashed lines indicate the rst and last payday policy changes considered in this paper. Treatment and control means weighted by population.
Dashed lines indicate the rst and last payday policy changes considered in this paper.
